UK Returning Defense Focus To NATO And Europe

Britain’s new prime minister, Keir Starmer, appears to be stepping back from the Indo-Pacific and refocusing the country’s armed forces for conflict in Europe.

Launching a reappraisal of the UK’s defense posture just days into his tenure, following the Labour Party’s landslide victory on July 4, Starmer is calling for a “root and branch review” of the country’s armed forces.

• Labour seeks closer defense cooperation with Germany
• Capability gaps may persist even if defense spending rises

Britain’s last assessment of its defense capability in 2021—a year before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—called on the UK to tilt its power projection into Asia to counter China’s emerging threat.

At the time, it recognized Russia as an “acute direct threat to the UK”; today, Russia is seen as the UK’s “foremost” adversary.

Ministers still consider the Asia-Pacific region crucial, highlighting the Australia, UK and U.S. (AUKUS) pact on nuclear submarines and the Global Combat Air Program with Italy and Japan as prime examples.

But officials acknowledge they need to be more realistic about the ability of Britain’s stretched military to send capability halfway around the world, when a focus on technology and diplomacy instead may be a better use of resources.

Starmer has suggested a “NATO-first” policy, with Defense Secretary John Healey and Foreign Secretary David Lammy writing in London’s The Daily Telegraph newspaper that “European security will be our foreign and defense priority.”

Starmer is calling for a reset in European ally relations, which were shaken by the UK’s Brexit decision to leave the European Union and by divisive Conservative leaders such as Boris Johnson and Liz Truss.

On July 18, Starmer will convene a meeting of the European Political Community in England, at which he is expected to call for the creation of a new EU-UK Security Pact for closer cooperation. The alliance could insert the UK into European defense initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation or European Defense Fund projects, initiatives that faced considerable criticism from the previous government.

Such a pact would “underpin closer cooperation . . . that complements the wider NATO alliance,” Healey and Lammy wrote.

The new government also is expected to emphasize a closer defense relationship with Germany, like that already forged with France.

Healey stated in a 2023 Royal United Services Institute paper that Berlin and London have “compatible forces, collaborative industry and common values.”

The potential of such a pact with Germany is “profound,” Healey said, and “brings benefits to NATO and to European security, not just to our own countries.”

A readout of Starmer’s NATO summit meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz confirms they will “strike a deep UK-Germany defense agreement . . . forging the agreement without delay.”

Perhaps most crucially for UK defense, the review is set to lay out a road map to increase defense spending equivalent to 2.5% of GDP as well as deliver a long-demanded defense industrial strategy and reforms to procurement, Starmer has said.

The previous administration intended to reach the 2.5% of GDP target by the end of this decade. However, the new government refuses to set a deadline, with Starmer stating that the government will follow its fiscal rules.

The UK’s struggle to grow its economy over the past decade—combined with the impact of Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and recent support to help residents with energy bills—has left government coffers dry and debt at 100% of GDP. Starmer’s government must proceed cautiously with new spending plans.

The UK spends about £64 billion ($83 billion) annually on defense, roughly equivalent to 2.2% of GDP; increasing the amount to about £70 billion a year would meet the 2.5% target, Aviation Week analysis suggests. Such an increase is difficult to achieve without sustained economic growth.

There are also fiscal pressures around the cost of the UK’s nuclear programs, including submarines for the country’s deterrent and the vessels for AUKUS. Auditors also have reported a £16.9 billion deficit in its 10-year equipment plan caused largely by inflation and foreign exchange rate fluctuations, and there are obvious capability gaps: a lack of ground-based air and missile defense and shortfalls in personnel, munitions and spare parts.

Even with additional funding, the UK may still face “stark choices” on capability priorities, Nick Childs and Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggest.

“How Labour conducts its review—including how fast as well as what outcomes it produces and at what level of investment—will all be the criteria on which it is judged in the end,” Childs and Barry state.